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Abstract 
 
The paper argues that the resilient democratic deficit of the EU is closely connected to its 
equally longstanding ‘sovereignty surplus.’ The division and competition of sovereignty 
between member states and the EU has created a more crowded space of overlapping 
polities, each requiring democratic legitimation but each also with the propensity to 
detract from the democratic capacity of the others. Secondly, the very gravity and 
divisiveness of what is at stake for the various parties involved and positions implicated 
in the sovereignty surplus renders the question of the proper diagnosis and treatment of 
the ensuing democratic deficit highly controversial and, indeed, sharply polarized. 
Thirdly and finally, and bringing us to the current constitutional controversy and mid-life 
crisis, the sovereignty surplus also makes the question of praxis - of how to secure the 
very ground of initiative necessary to develop and act on a more inclusively resolved 
diagnosis and treatment of the democratic deficit – whatever that may be, difficult if not 
intractable. 
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Europe at 50 - A Mid-Life Crisis?  
‘Democratic Deficit’ and ‘Sovereignty Surplus’ 
Part Three of the Constitution Trilogy 
 
 
The 50th Anniversary of the foundation of the EU in the 1957 Treaty of Rome was 
celebrated in March of this year. Coinciding as it has with a period of prolonged introspection 
and a recurrent search for new beginnings, of which the spectacular rise and fall of the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty (CT) is only the most prominent example, this half-century landmark (and 
the heated debate over the Berlin Declaration1 which was made in celebration of that landmark) 
has attracted many clichés and slogans. With regard to the early fanfare and subsequent 
tribulations of the CT, for example, there has been talk of Golden Weddings, but also of false 
seduction, empty promises, prolonged or broken engagements, uneasy co-habitation, 
polygamous unions (otherwise known as ‘flexible integration’), trial separations, and even, in 
some quarters – especially after the formal announcement of the abandonment of the project by 
the June 2007 European Council - of divorce. And if we turn from relationship to aging 
metaphors, and so from Anniversaries to Birthdays, we also hear talk of growing pains, 
weariness, sclerosis, premature aging, and perhaps most aptly of all given the particular birthday 
we are celebrating – of mid-life crisis.2  
 
Beyond the sound bites there is something substantial at stake. And if I am permitted one 
more cliché, that thing of substance involves the idea of the EU as somehow being a victim of its 
own success. However much lawyers, political scientists, international relations experts and 
economists may argue that the EU was or was not unique from the outset – and much ink has 
been spilled on this topic – it is certainly the case that it has grown into something different from 
what we have known before in the world of politics – a new beast, or at least a distinctive hybrid, 
in the polity-jungle previously dominated by states and their sub-state offspring. (Schmitter, 
1996) As is well known, the EU has expanded from its post-war origins as a customs union and 
free trade area to a much broader and deeper framework of political integration with power over 
a range of social and security measures on top of its core economic competence. Its bureaucracy 
and distinctive political machinery has developed exponentially, as has its membership from the 
original 6 to the present 27. Its symbolic profile both within these 27 members and beyond is 
also much higher. More and more, it is viewed as, and presents itself as a qualitative departure 
from the international institutional norm, as a self-standing’ three-dimensional’ polity rather than 
just a ‘two-dimensional’ set of institutions or cluster of policy functions. One simple illustration 
of this ‘thicker’ understanding is that while events are typically described as happening ‘at’ the 
United Nations, the appropriate preposition for the EU (unless one is reading American 
newspapers!) is generally considered to be ‘in’. But this exponential expansion has also 
precipitated new challenges in each of the three vectors in which the key relations of this 
fledgling polity are played out – externally, at the inside/outside boundary, and internally.  
 
                                                 
1 25th March 2007 
2 See The Economist 16th March 2007. Interestingly, The Economist had used the very same terminology 10 years 
previously, on the occasion of the EU’s 40th birthday. (see The Economist 29th May 1997) It seems that, even for 
institutions, 50 has become the new 40!  
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Externally, the growing prominence of the EU and its gradual assumption of some of the 
functions of the state mean that the place of the EU in international relations has become more 
rather than less ambiguous over time. Many of its formal legal agreements with the outside world 
are so-called ‘mixed’ ones, and most of its informal foreign policy also operates in an indistinct 
and shifting framework of co-operation and competition with the foreign policy relations of its 
member states. (De Witte, 2007) To put it bluntly, Henry Kissinger’s famous question – whom 
do we call when we wants to speak to Europe, remains unanswered today, and where once there 
was no viable candidate, in an age of increasing inter-institutional rivalry there are now perhaps 
too many. At the boundaries, Enlargement remains an explosive question despite, or perhaps 
because of the accession of 12 new members in the new century. For how precisely are we to 
understand the rationale and status of these new boundaries? Are these boundaries merely selfish 
and pragmatic - located just at the point of self-convenience where the club of the rich and 
comfortable decrees itself full up; or are they territorial – aligned to some sense of a geographic 
Europe; or are they ideological, linked to the Cold War invitation to membership in the original 
Treaty of Rome, extended towards all ‘the other peoples of Europe’ and towards the Soviet Bloc 
countries in particular; or are they cultural – a community of affinity that may not include our 
Muslim neighbors in Turkey or in parts of the former Yugoslavia; or do they retain a missionary 
openness, reflecting a willingness to spread the European message just wherever it finds a 
receptive audience. Clearly, this is a much conflicted question. And again, the very success of 
Europe makes it an ever more urgent question, just as the rapidity and reach of recent expansion 
now demands that it be asked in places which may well be presumptively excluded in terms of 
some of these definitions. (Grabbe, 2006)  
 
However, the space I am directly concerned with in the present paper is neither the 
external nor the boundary space, but the internal space. For here the success of the EU has raised 
an even more fundamental question of legitimacy. If, as Jürgen Habermas has suggested, 
democracy, the idea of self-legislation, that those affected by decisions bearing in any significant 
way on their life-chances should get to have a say in these decisions - is the only political 
principle we can all agree on in a ‘post-metaphysical’ age where are no longer any pre-given 
moral certainties, then what happens when, as now, we have reached a certain critical point in 
the life of the EU at which its success means that it palpably does make decisions that 
significantly bear-upon the life-chances of its members? 
 
 This is, of course, the hoary old problem of the EU’s so-called ‘democratic deficit’. I 
want to argue that this democratic deficit is intimately related to a rather less well-known 
phenomenon, what I call the ‘sovereignty surplus’ of the EU – the fact that, as I explain in more 
detail in due course, sovereignty is no longer an exclusive attribute of the nation states that make 
up the EU, but that it can now in some measure be plausibly claimed by the EU itself without the 
states themselves having renounced or even significantly modified their own claims.(Walker, 
2003) In particular I want to argue that the sovereignty surplus underscores the democratic 
deficit in three ways. It is, first, the deep cause of the democratic deficit. Secondly, the very 
gravity and divisiveness of what is at stake for the various parties involved and positions 
implicated in the sovereignty surplus renders the question of the proper diagnosis and treatment 
of the ensuing democratic deficit highly controversial and, indeed, sharply polarized. Thirdly and 
finally, and bringing us back to the current constitutional controversy and mid-life crisis, the 
sovereignty surplus also makes the question of praxis - of how to secure the very ground of 
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initiative necessary to develop and act on a more inclusively resolved diagnosis and treatment of 
the democratic deficit – whatever that may be, difficult if not intractable. So, to recap, with 
reference to the democratic deficit the sovereignty surplus is responsible for three aspects of the 
difficulty - the problem of deep causes, the problem of diagnostic controversy, and the problem 
of the ever disappearing ground of transformative initiative. 
 
 
* 
 
Let us deal, then, with the various parts of this argument in turn starting with the 
definition of the democratic deficit. (Follesdal and Hix, 2006) The Democratic Deficit can be 
summed up alliteratively under the five ‘A’s 
 
Alienation – Most obviously, and notoriously, the growth of the EU involves a shift from 
nationally autonomous parliamentary power to pooled executive power at the EU level in the 
Council (of ministers) and in the European Council. This refers, then, to a two-stage movement – 
first an internal state movement from parliament to executive and, secondly, through the national 
executives acting in concert, a more general hollowing out of state democratic authority.  
 
Authority – There is a democracy-diminishing and democracy-obscuring mixture of 
different forms of authority at EU level. The Commission (bureaucratic), Court of Justice and, 
increasingly, Court of First Instance, (judicial) and Council (executive), all assume key 
responsibilities some of which might in other polities fall within the remit of directly elected 
institutions. The EU’s own such directly-elected institution, the Parliament, has only a limited 
role in legislation. It does not propose new legislation and at the disposal stage, depending on the 
policy area in question, it is either joint-legislator or merely a consulted party.  
 
Attention - Few people pay attention to the European Parliament – less than 45% turned 
out at the last elections in 2004. And those who do vote continue to treat these occasions as 
‘second order’ national elections, a fact of which the very modest success and salience of the 
European wide political parties is both a symptom and a cause. 
 
Abstraction –The specific density and gravity of each individual vote may be too little 
and too light in a community of almost 500 million. 
 
Affinity – This refers to the so-called ‘no-demos’ problem. (Weiler, 1999, ch.10) 
Arguably, this is the deepest, and unarguably the most complex, predicament of supranational 
democracy. The ‘no-demos’ argument comes in different variants, but in its fullest form it is 
about both the ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of democracy (Scharpf, 1999) and the intimate connection 
between them. It asserts that there is a set of social preconditions to democracy which also, 
crucially, happen to be amongst the most important benefits (re)produced and consolidated by 
democracy, and where these are non-existent or insufficiently present, as is presumptively the 
case in the post-national EU, then we struggle to contrive them into existence. At sociological 
root, what we are talking about is the existence or otherwise of a minimum level of ‘we feeling’ 
– wherever such a feeling may come from and however it may be constructed - that is required in 
order both to be able to put in place the mechanisms and to enjoy the benefits associated with 
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democracy as a system of collective decision-making that pays equal basic concern to each of its 
member’s interests and preference when coming to particular collective decisions. If we do not 
possess that threshold ‘we feeling,’ then either the mechanisms of democratic decision-making 
will not be forthcoming or, even if they are, they will remain empty promises. The relevant 
elements that in this ‘demos’ model are simultaneously dimensions of the we-feeling and 
benefits of democracy are four in number – let us then call them, the ‘constituent goods’ of 
democracy in acknowledgment of their dual aspect as generative sources and standing features of 
the democratic ‘good.’. First, without the relevant minimum sense of membership of a common 
political community, we may, not respect others enough to be prepared to treat them as political 
equals and so to abide by our binding common commitments; secondly, and reciprocally, we 
may not trust others enough to expect them to respect and treat us as political equals and so to 
abide by our binding common commitments; thirdly, as an extension of this lack of mutual 
respect and trust, we may not be sufficiently invested in the idea of our long term common 
commitment to accept sacrifices in the name of some common good or pressing particular 
interests of other constituencies within the community; and fourthly, we may not be confident 
enough of what we do or can possess in common to be able to provide and accept means for 
respecting what we can also afford not to have in common, and which should therefore remain 
an area of tolerable difference. In sum, we may lack the trust, respect, solidarity and mutual 
sympathy that allow democracy to emerge and help it to work properly when it does emerge.  
 
 
* 
 
If we turn now to the sovereignty dimension of our equation, in what sense does the 
surplus of sovereignty provide the deep cause of the democratic deficit? Sovereignty in its 
modern sense, the sense associated with Westphalian system of states – refers to the idea of a 
politically enabled and legally recognized coincidence of people, territory and authority. As a 
framing idea of global relations, sovereign statehood does not and never have required empirical 
perfection. That is to say, it does not require that authority is in fact monopolized in discrete 
territorial populations, but just that states should retain a plausible claim to be and to remain the 
predominant authority over their own territory and population in an everyday sense, as well as 
the ultimate authority in extremis, and that the logic of this arrangement be respected precisely in 
the mutual exclusivity of the sovereignty claim between states. The development of the EU 
threatens both of these ideas – both the everyday pre-eminence of the state as the source of 
authority across the plenitude of policy sectors in a particular territory and over a particular 
population – call this substantive sovereignty – and the final claim to ultimate authority in 
circumstances of challenge – call this the categorical form of sovereignty. As recently abandoned 
Constitutional Treaty would have made explicit, but as has in any case been taken for granted 
within the Treaty system, the EU has shared competence over many policy sectors once 
monopolized by the states and, indeed, exclusive competence over a few key areas such as the 
common commercial policy and economic and monetary union. Accordingly, the substantive 
sovereignty of the states has long been subject to erosion. What is more, under the effective 
tutelage of the ECJ, this challenge of substance has from an early stage been underpinned by a 
more categorical challenge, through legal claims of supremacy and direct effect, and more 
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generally, through its confident pursuit of “small-‘c’” constitutional self-definition and self-
sufficiency. In combination these claims question whether the states retain even last-analysis 
sovereignty to impose their will (or, indeed, to recover the competence and capacity to do so).  
 
The net effect of these challenges to the substance and very form of state sovereignty is 
that sovereignty is progressively understood as split and spread around in a quite unprecedented 
manner. It is not or no longer best conceived as merely redistributed in a mixed or multi-layered 
or federal ‘system’, for that would still presuppose a single final authority for the system in 
question and an overarching principle or rule for deciding the hierarchy of norms within that 
system. In other words, it would assume that all the problems could be ‘domesticated’ as 
questions of divided power contained within an unquestionably statist or state-like frame. Rather, 
sovereignty is now more persuasively conceived as distributed across a plurality of overlapping 
sites whose relations are finally heterarchical rather than hierarchical.  
 
What this new sovereignty configuration means, presumptively at least, is that the need 
for democracy is also split and spread around in the trail of these new sites of sovereignty. Yet, 
to put it mildly, and in an agnostic and empirically contingent way, there can be no guarantees 
that the institutional means and cultural resources necessary for democracy will be sufficiently 
abundant and sufficiently flexible and mobile to meet the spreading need. Or to put it strongly 
and in a categorical way, just as sovereignty under the state system was based on a logic of 
exclusivity, the bonds and commitments that make democracy viable may also operate on the 
basis of a logic of exclusivity and thus become simply inconceivable at a plurality of levels 
simultaneously, and so at levels and places beyond the state. Whether in the mild or strong 
version, therefore, the surplus of sovereignty tends towards a deficit of democracy. 
 
If we now move on to the second way in which the sovereignty surplus underpins the 
democratic deficit, this concerns the importance and divisiveness of what is at stake in the 
specific diagnosis and treatment of the democratic deficit. For we can identify a variety of 
different diagnoses and treatments of the democratic deficit, each of which leads to different 
conclusions – and may, furthermore, flow from different premises - as regards the proper 
allocation of sovereign power. For the sake of simplicity, we may reduce these approaches to six 
somewhat stylized variants. These can sometimes be combined, but some variants, as we will 
see, are also quite clearly incompatible and so mutually exclusive. Again, we will make use of an 
alliterative device, referring to the six ‘D’s. 
 
Denial - This assumes or holds that nothing of much import has changed, and that, 
contrary to many views, the work of the EU remains mundane and - at least in high political 
terms – inconsequential, and so the threshold norm of democratic significance at the EU level 
has not or barely been reached. To the extent that the denial view still exists, this is simply 
decayed or nostalgic thinking, although no less powerful for that. 
 
Delegation - This approach, which is often accompanied by some degree of denial, holds 
that the problem of democratic reach and accountability can or should be taken care of through a 
theory of delegation – of national principal and supranational agent. (Moravcsik, 2005) But the 
actual institutional conditions of the EU stretch our sense of the institutional plausibility of this. 
In particular, the paradigmatic supranational decision rules of unanimity and Qualified Majority 
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Voting, the best gatekeeping argument for the principal-agent characterization prior to 
supranational initiatives, becomes the strongest objection to any robust thesis of ongoing 
principal control after such initiatives have taken place, as they have now done progressively 
over 50 years.  
 
Demarcation - This is based on the idea that, whether or not we view it as necessary and 
inevitable, we can represent the democratic deficit as a virtue rather than a vice, since the core 
areas of EU’s activity are just those that we should in any case cordon off and insulate from 
democratic passions and preferences. Two major sub-options have presented themselves here, 
each of which has been extremely influential in the history of EU integration. First, there is the 
ordo-liberal tradition, which asks for the basic structure of market-making and market-enhancing 
‘four freedoms’ and competition law to be protected from EU-level legislative and executive 
interference concerned with particular socio-economic interests – an activity that should instead 
be left to member states. (Mestmacker, 1994) Secondly, there is the perspective which views the 
EU as a so-called ‘regulatory state.’ (Majone, 2005) In contrast to the ordo-liberal approach, it is 
recognized that the EU does and should get involved beyond its core market-making activity, but 
still not in key distributive questions or questions of deep value difference. Rather, the domain 
and style of ‘positive integration’ measures at the EU level should be restricted to precise matters 
of risk regulation in areas such as environmental or product standards. These should be left to 
experts and administrators concerned with protecting and finessing the Pareto-optimal solutions 
available on the basis of the general wealth enhancement of an expanded European market, 
rather than becoming the play of partisan political forces.  
 
While the demarcation approaches do rightly remind us that not all of political decision-
making can or should be subject to democratic will formation, they fail to the extent that they 
overstate the propensity and the capacity of the EU to stay clear of everyday distributive ‘winner 
and loser’ politics that do require democratic will formation. This is most obviously true of the 
ordo-liberal tradition which is unable to cope with any type of market correcting European re-
regulation in areas of socially relevant standards or processes – from food safety to health 
advertising to labor market discrimination. But it is also true of the regulatory state approach, to 
the extent that it is prepared to rely on disinterested expertise in such re-regulation in a way that 
ignores two things. First, it ignores the pervasiveness of win-lose situations where decisions 
which may be of general public good and of benefit to everyone (food safety, environmental 
protection) nevertheless create sharp secondary divisions between winners and losers in the cycle 
of production, exchange and circulation – producers versus consumers, workers versus capital 
investors, domestic versus foreign customers etc. And secondly, it ignores the extent to which 
European-wide jurisdiction, even when not itself concerned with large distributive choices, can 
in the name of what it is primarily concerned with and competent over, namely market-making 
and regulatory forms of market-correction, create a decision-making gap by undermining the 
economic or legal capacity of states to undertake their own distributive policies. (Scharpf, 1999) 
Economically, this would, for example, concern the need for states to keep direct taxes down in 
order not to put off mobile capital investment. Legally, this would, for example, include the side-
effects of monetary union - carried out in the name of removing market inefficiency born of 
fluctuating exchange rates - in removing domestic mechanisms for influencing domestic public 
revenue such as currency devaluation; or the prohibition for reasons of competitive equality of 
forms of preferential or compensatory distributive treatment such as regional or sectoral 
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subsidies, or the strategic use of public procurement, or the employment buffers of subsidized 
public sector industries.  
 
Disaggregation - Here democracy becomes an adjective rather than a noun – a mobile 
virtue of particular arrangements in domains or policy communities of discrete practical 
engagement where people have the knowledge and motivation to put things in common rather 
than a holistic virtue of the large community of the ‘demos’ What we need, on this view, is not 
mass ballot-box democracy and preference formation, but a multiplicity of finely grained 
engagements of knowledgeable and mutually responsive constituencies aimed at providing 
context-specific optimizations of the common good. And if we look we can find just such 
contexts in abundance in the EU across many different policy areas and mediated through such 
deliberative mechanisms as Comitology and the Open Method of Co-ordination. (Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2007) 
 
But there is a level of analysis problem here. Democracy can indeed be disaggregated, 
and often does its best work in local micro-contexts. However, unless we are prepared to say that 
there are no mutual effects or ‘externalities’ between these discrete policy areas and communities 
which need trans-contextual evaluation, that there is and should be no broader conception of the 
public interest (distributive fairness, equal rights protection etc) which guides individual sectoral 
choices rather than merely emerges as their cumulative and serendipitous effect, and that, 
crucially underpinning these other concerns, there is either no need for or no danger to and 
depreciation of the constitutive public goods of trust, respect, solidarity and mutual tolerance in 
this disaggregated approach, then there is something deficient in this analysis. In particular, it is 
in danger of forgetting the twofold nature of the ‘demos’ problem we discussed earlier – that it 
represents a shorthand for certain constitutive goods - equal respect, trust, solidarity and mutual 
tolerance - which not only make the broader democratic framework possible, but which are also 
among its greatest virtues and outputs. So the fact that we find an alternative route, or series of 
cris-crossing routes, in the input sense, in order to make democratic practice possible at 
disaggregated sites in the absence of these constitutive goods at the input stage, still will not cure 
their absence in the output sense.  
 
Displacement - This is the inverse of denial. If democracy is fated to be unitary, then 
perhaps we should fast-forward to EU democracy and leave behind state democracy as outmoded 
or, at least, as now subordinate. As in the case of its opposite, the fact that this strong Euro-
federalist view is held implicitly much more than it is expressed explicitly and rests on unlikely 
assumptions about the readiness of the forces of social and political transformation, does not 
make it any less powerful for that.  
 
Dualism - This is the view which says that we need not endorse either the state-centric or 
the Euro-centric, unitary-sovereigntist view of the deniers and delegaters on the one hand and the 
displacers on the other. Equally, we should not be satisfied by the democracy-diminishing view 
of the demarcation approach – often itself tending towards a closet vision of European-centered 
unitary sovereignty - nor by the view of the disaggregater, which tries to oppose the whole idea 
of a polity-monolithic logic and the ideas of holistic democracy and sovereignty which 
accompany that logic. Rather, on the dualist view, we can have a dual or multi-level democracy 
with each level holistic and demos-presupposing in its own terms. 
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In principle, this promises the most attractively ‘pro-democratic’ solution to the extent 
that it does not allow democracy under conditions of plural sovereignty to be defeated by the 
assumptions of the unitary sovereigntist frame – neither forcing it backwards into a statist nor 
fast-forwarding it into a superstatist mould, nor side-stepping the issue by denying or 
disaggregating some of democracy’s virtues at any site Yet this approach is of no value if it 
simply presents the problem-diagnosis as a sufficient condition of its solution, so ignoring the 
resilience of the unitary sovereigntist frame. It has to face up to and overcome the abiding 
challenges of this frame, which, in conclusion, are for the dualist model threefold.  
 
The first is the structural challenge. Does the idea of holistic democracy – with the 
associated virtues of respect, trust, solidarity and mutual tolerance, not after all, as the state and 
super state unitarians alike hold, simply possess a strong and perhaps exclusive ‘elective affinity’ 
with the structural idea of unitary sovereignty? The short empirical answer would be no - that 
federal and devolved and other pluri--national and pluri-community systems show us many 
examples of multi-level holistic democratic loyalty – and indeed that the possibility of secure 
communal living in a number of the federalized or devolved states that make up the EU –
including the UK, Belgium and Spain - depends on this being so. So why should the EU system 
be any different, especially given the significant long-term institution-constructive work that has 
gone into developing the European Parliament in particular as a support and forum for the wider 
level of European democracy? But this analogy rather begs the question, since one key 
remaining difference lies precisely in the idea of these examples all being of state-framed 
systems. Accordingly, the division of powers and even of demos-creating cultural identities 
occurs within the context of a single last-analysis sovereignty (or, at least, as in the British-Irish 
conflict, between discrete and mutually exclusive last-analysis sovereigns). Is this possible in a 
multi-sovereign, territorially and jurisdictionally overlapping configuration such as the EU, 
which does not subserve to the discipline of internal hierarchy and system-integrity, and where 
identities and loyalties are not nested within one overall system which provides both the ordering 
mechanism and inter-cultural traditions for managing and resolving these issues? 
 
In turn, this refocuses a second cultural challenge, no longer about the impossibility in 
principle of split-level holistic democratic commitments, but now about the social backdrop. In 
particular, how do we nurture this dual sense of loyalty in unfavorable ideological 
circumstances? These are circumstances often dominated, or at least distorted and shadowed by 
the contradictory extremes of unitary sovereignty and democracy at state and supranational level, 
or, in more minor key, characterized by the institutionalized prevalence of solutions of the 
demarcators and disaggregators that also tend to exclude or marginalize any dualist way for 
robust democracy at the European level.  
 
This, finally, brings us to the protracted tribulations and aftermath of the constitutional 
debate. For, quite apart from, but arguably more importantly than, any of its particular 
provisions, the constitutional project could be seen both, at the procedural level, as a mechanism 
for bringing together these different and incompatible diagnoses and treatment of the democratic 
deficit problem within the same decision-making matrix with a view to removing or easing - or 
at least confronting and engaging - the ideological blockages to such a solution; and, at the 
expressive level, through the mobilization effect of the process itself and the symbolism of 
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constitutional commitment, as an independent stimulus to the strengthening of holistic 
democracy at the secondary supranational level. Yet this runs into the third and final problem of 
sovereignty surplus and a third, practical challenge to the idea of dualist democracy. Crucially, it 
is the present sovereignty frame – and in particular the principle of the requirement of 
unanimous state consent or ‘common accord’ - that provides the necessary but presumptively 
disabling conditions of initiative of any constitutional solution seeking to unblock the problems 
of democratic deficit which, as we have seen, are themselves a product of the very same structure 
of unitary sovereignty. The whole constitutional project, indeed, from the supposedly state-
sovereignty transcending initiative of a multi-constituency Constitutional Convention in 2002-3 
to the current strange combination of protracted but ultimately doomed struggles over national 
ratification on the one hand, and an obstinate and surprisingly widespread commitment to keep 
the process of holistic reflection and commitment seamlessly afloat even in the formally post-
constitutional phase of the new so-called ‘Reform Treaty’ initiative on the other, can be seen as 
an attempt to come to terms with this final and potentially paralyzing paradox of the sovereignty 
frame. 
 
Whether, when, and on what terms such a process may succeed, remains to be seen. It is 
a topic, I suspect, not just for the next few months as the current European political elites would 
prefer, but for the second 50 years of European integration. What can be said in anticipation, 
however, is that the only genuine hope for Europe to overcome its mid-life crisis lies in the 
continuing and potentially self-reinforcing strength of the democratic ideal itself. In particular, 
this depends upon continuing appreciation and stubborn pursuit of the possibility that while, as 
we have seen, any particular grounded system of democratic practice is unable to specify its own 
‘who decides what’ framework conditions in a democratic fashion and must therefore rely on a 
prior ‘sovereign’ frame to answer this question, the democratic principle of self-government 
need not be the docile prisoner of that frame and can instead rise above its context. In so doing, 
in Europe, just as we have often required of it and continue to ask of it elsewhere, ‘democracy’ 
can provide an ongoing basis of self-critique and an iterative force for self-transformation 
(Benhabib, 2006) – one whose form and outcome cannot be, and should not be, entirely 
predictable.  
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